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This paper assesses the impact of academic selection at age 11 on children in the minority of areas that 
still operate such a system. The answers are very clear. Overall there is little or no impact on 
attainment, but those educated in grammar schools do substantially better (around four grade points 
more than pupils with the same Key Stage 2 (KS2) points in similar, but non-selective, areas). This is 
equivalent to raising four GCSEs from a grade ‘C’ to a ‘B’.  Other children within selective areas who 
do not gain a place in a grammar school are disadvantaged by a little under one grade point. In part 
these effects stem from the substantive under representation of poorer and special needs children in 
grammar schools. Only 32% of high ability children eligible for free school meals (FSM) attend 
grammar schools compared with 60% of non-FSM pupils. So whilst the net effect of selection is not 
substantive it does result in gains for those attending the grammar schools and a slight disadvantage for 
the rest. The paradox is that grammar schools bestow greater advantages to poor children than more 
affluent children, but very few make the cut.  
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1. Introduction 
 There has been a great deal of discussion about the remaining grammar schools in 
England and the justification for keeping any form of academic selection in a mainly 
“comprehensive” education system. On 20 January 2003 the then Labour education 
secretary Charles Clarke called for a debate on the impact of grammar schools on 
standards, less than two weeks after being quoted in the Time Education Supplement 
(TES 10/1/03) as saying that selection at 11  “inhibited educational opportunities”. 
The current Education Bill before Parliament has explicitly ruled out selection by 
ability as a means of allocating pupils to schools in the proposed Trust Schools. It is 
our intention to inform the selection debate using data from the English national pupil 
database (PLASC) constructed by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES). 
We explore whether overall performance is higher or lower in selective local 
education authorities (LEAs) and ask who is advantaged and who is disadvantaged by 
this education selection mechanism.  
 
The PLASC database gives detailed information about all pupils in the English state 
school system, including national test results and personal data, such as ethnicity and 
eligibility for free school meals. National test results from PLASC are employed in 
this research as measures of prior ability and output. Pupils in English schools are 
educated in four key stages and take national tests at set the end of each key stage. 
The tests at the end of key stage 2 (KS2) generally coincide with the end of primary 
schooling at age 11 and provide a useful indication of academic ability on entry to 
secondary school. Key stage 3 (KS3) tests are taken at age 14, and formal 
qualifications, GCSE and GNVQ exams, are taken at the end of key stage 4 (KS4), 
when the pupils are 16.   
 
Selection is present in the English education system in various forms. Church schools, 
admissions policies for over-subscribed schools, exclusion practices and specialist 
status all offer opportunities for state schools to make choices about the pupils they 
educate and those they turn away. Whilst most independent schools select their pupils 
based on ability to pay and/or academic achievement, only a minority of state   3
educated pupils sit a formal test (the 11 plus
1) to ascertain the type of schooling they 
should receive. In a few LEAs those with the highest scores in the test are offered a 
place in a grammar school, whilst the remaining pupils attend other schools in the area 
(nominally “secondary modern schools” or “comprehensive schools”). It is this form 
of academic selection that is the focus of our analysis. It has been noted that most 
comprehensive schools also engage in selective teaching by setting pupils once in the 
school. This is different from selective education since it allows pupils to be in 
different sets for different subjects and to change sets if they progress more or less 
than their classmates; reassessment is possible at any age. 
 
The debate surrounding academic selection at age 11 is more than simply a discussion 
about raw attainment. The current drive to raise achievement in secondary schools 
across England means there is substantial interest in knowing what type of education 
system adds the most value to all pupils. In addition, recent evidence that social 
mobility has declined over the last twenty years has been linked by some to the 
decline of grammar schools. Grammar schools have historically been considered to 
offer a route for advancement by bright children from deprived backgrounds (see The 
Economist, 2004, for example). We therefore compare the outcomes of all secondary 
school pupils in LEAs with grammar schools, with pupils in similar non-selective 
areas. We examine the relative progress in these similar areas across the ability 
distribution and in particular we consider the outcomes of `borderline’ pupils in 
grammar and non-grammar schools.  We pay particular attention to the value added 
by different selective and non-selective systems to the test scores of children from low 
income families.  We also discuss the additional impact of being educated in single 
sex or religious schools.  
 
Further, we explore the critical issue of differential access to grammar schools at age 
11 across pupil characteristics including children eligible for free school meals. 
Hence, we investigate whether selection is more or less socially divisive than 
comprehensive education. If academic selection improves the chances of children in 
poverty to get into the best schools we might expect to see less socio-economic 
                                                 
1 The 11 plus test is a grammar school entrance exam taken at roughly the same time as KS2 SATS. It 
is not a national attainment test, and can be set by the school or the local education authority.  Pupils   4
segregation in selective areas than in similar LEAs without overt selection but with 
high demand for good schools.   
 
Getting into a grammar school is clearly not random – it depends on a range of 
characteristics and circumstances, including both ability and geographical location.  
Furthermore, areas with academic selection are on average more affluent than other 
areas. This makes comparing these LEAs with the rest of the country potentially 
misleading. We address these selection issues in three ways: First, we compare 
selective LEAs with a group of non-selective LEAs that have similar characteristics 
(identified using propensity matching); secondly, we compare pupils relative 
improvements in grades over time (value-added) rather than raw attainment, and 
finally, we undertake an instrumental variables (IV) approach, which explores the 
variation in pupil attainment from attending a grammar school that is derived from 
age within the school year rather than ability.   It should be noted that we also check 
whether primary school pupils achieve more in selective LEAs than our matched 
LEAs.  
 
Several features stand out from the initial exploratory work on the PLASC data- girls 
are more likely to attend grammar schools than boys, as are children born in the first 
four months of the school year (September to December). More striking, however, is 
the large under representation of those eligible for free school meals (FSM).  This is 
still markedly so even when we condition on pupil attainment at age 11. Bright, poor 
children rarely secure a grammar school place.  
 
The results of our analysis indicate that selective LEAs overall do not achieve 
substantially improved performance compared with similar non-selective LEAs. 
Grammar school pupils do demonstrate significantly higher levels of attainment, but 
those children not attending grammar schools in selective areas do slightly less well 
than their peers in non-selective areas. In part this appears to stem from the crowding 
of poor pupils into the non-grammar schools.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
who do not want to apply for a place in the grammar school do not have to sit the test. See 
http://www.nfer.ac.uk/infoservices/sst/asp for further information on selection tests.   5
The minority of able poor children who do attend grammar schools do exceptionally 
well. Hence there are two countervailing factors around grammar schools and social 
mobility: Bright children eligible for FSM do exceptionally well in grammar schools 
but very few achieve a place, even given attainment levels at age 11. It is likely that 
this reflects greater efforts by affluent parents to coach their children to pass the 
selection exam (often referred to as the 11+).  It may also be that schools are selecting 
pupils using criteria other than ability, as there is a grey area where high attainment in 
the 11+ exam doesn’t automatically secure admission if there is competition for 
places even after setting the pass-mark.  
 
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 lays out existing evidence 
and some issues about the impact of academic selection on attainment. The data 
employed is discussed Section 3. Section 4 identifies who is most likely to gain a 
grammar school place within selective LEAs. Section 5 addresses the problem of 
identifying which non-selective LEAs make up a reasonable comparison group for the 
selective areas on the basis of observed characteristics of their resident populations. 
Section 6 looks at the two key issues 1) differences in attainment between selective 
and non-selective areas and 2) differences in attainment between those making it into 
a grammar school and those not within selective LEAs. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Studies of selection using early cohorts (pre 1987) are limited because the 
examination system in England had two types of final exams dependent on ability 
(high ability pupils took GCE exams at age 16 whilst lower ability pupils took CSE).  
Sullivan and Heath (2002) use the National Child Development Survey data (NCDS) 
to compare state and private schools and find a benefit to getting a place in a grammar 
school as opposed to a comprehensive school for pupils who were in the top third of 
the ability distribution at age 11 in 1969, but this says nothing about the system as a 
whole. As Schagen and Schagen (2001) point out, to determine which system is most 
effective it is necessary to compare performance of all pupils in each type of system.  
Most researchers therefore compare the remaining selective systems with fully 
comprehensive systems across England. Jesson (2000), for example, uses matched 
KS3-GCSE data to analyse value added performance of different areas and finds that 
comprehensive systems perform at least as well as those retaining selective schools.     6
However, the selection into grammar schools occurs three years before the KS3 tests 
at age 14. Research by the DfES (2002) indicates that pupils across the ability 
distribution who were 16 in 2000/2001 made as much or more progress between KS2 
and KS3 in “designated selective”
2 LEAs as in non selective LEAs.  
 
The recent release of the PLASC data and associated tables has led to a resurgence of 
interest in evaluating school output since the data allows researchers to follow pupils 
throughout their school career.  Using this data, Hutchison and Scott (2003) find that 
grammar schools add value on average but that high achieving 11 year olds do not 
benefit at GCSE level from grammar school education. 
 
There is a lack of consensus about the extent to which grammar schooling benefits 
poorer children in our communities and whether selection is more or less socially 
divisive than a comprehensive system with competition for places.  This is partly due 
to the difficulty of obtaining pupil level socio-economic data, and possibly also due to 
a lack of recognition of the scale of economic change in England since academic 
selection was the norm (Edwards and Tomlinson 2002).   
 
Researchers have attempted to compare schools with similar socio-economic intakes 
by using free school meals (FSM) as an indicator of poverty.  Families with very low 
incomes and in receipt of state benefits are eligible for free school meals
3. Recent 
Government statistics verify a negative correlation between school levels of poverty 
and exam results (DfES Bulletin, 2002). Raw results are lower in most schools with 
large numbers of pupils eligible for free school meals. The DfES also analyses 
performance of high ability pupils in schools with similar proportions of FSM eligible 
children (less than 5%).  Results indicate more progression in grammar schools 
between KS2 and KS3, but no significant difference in the progression of children in 
different types of school during KS4. 
                                                 
2 Designated selective refers to LEAs where a ballot would be needed to change the status quo.  They 
are identified as areas where 25% of pupils in state secondary mainstream schools attend a grammar 
school. 
3 It is in a schools interest to collect FSM data as both school funding and school assessment are based 
on the percentage of pupils eligible. This does not guarantee that the FSM data includes all pupils 
living in poverty; there are various reasons why a family may not reveal their eligibility.  See Gorard et 
al (2002 p7) for a discussion on the collection of FSM data. 
   7
 
In 2004 the Education Select Committee of MPs suggested that “All forms of 
selection at one set of schools have, as a matter of arithmetic, consequences for other 
schools.”
4  Peter Robinson
5 notes in the TES (11/10/02) “If your child goes to a 
school surrounded by a lot of disadvantaged kids, your child is likely to do less well”.  
When talking about the results of the 2000 PISA study he says “they suggested that 
the peer group affect was a more powerful predictor than some of the individual 
factors about background and class.”  One conclusion that could be drawn from these 
observations is that it is in the interest of a bright child from a poor household to be 
educated away from other children living in poverty. It appears that this is not 
happening; Gorard et al (2002) note that between 1997 and 2001 segregation by 
income was rising across schools in England. The Education Network
6 note that the 
proportion of schools at the extremes of the FSM distribution are growing. They also 
point out that three quarters of the schools with only 1% of pupils eligible for free 
school meals are grammar schools.  
 
The 11+ exam is intended to identify the brightest pupils, and inevitably creates a 
group of borderline pupils with similar ability but marginally different test scores, 
who are then separated into different types of school. Qualitative studies have found 
that pupils can feel failures if they are not chosen to be in the top group or best school.  
For example Boaler (2000) notes that when pupils were placed into ability sets within 
a school “students in low groups felt disaffected on account of low expectations of 
their capacity…and a continuous diet of low-level work….”.  NFER research in 2001 
looking at the impact of the structure of secondary education in Slough found that 
“selection mainly affects children of `borderline’ ability.” They found that Slough’s 
borderline pupils who were not in grammar schools were less successful than similar 
pupils educated elsewhere in comprehensive schools. These findings are also 
confirmed by Schagen and Schagen (2001) at GCSE level; they find that middle 
ability pupils in grammar schools have an advantage at GCSE over their peers in other 
types of schools.  
                                                 
4 Reported on BBC Online 22/07/04 at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/3914257.stm 
5 Peter Robinson is head of research at the Institute for Public Policy Research 
6 see: 
http://www.ednet.org.uk/artsearch1.taf?function=detail&article_uid1=3437&_UserReference=DBF1E
CBA4CCFD7DBC311A3AD&head=3   8
 
Low attainment of borderline pupils in secondary modern schools could indicate that 
these pupils have unobservable characteristics, which make them less likely to 
succeed. An interesting hypothesis put forward by Critchlow (2003) to explain why 
value added between KS2 and KS3 appears to be higher in grammar schools is that 
the selection process allows greater discrimination than the key stage tests can 
identify.  In effect, pupils with the same key stage test results are subdivided with the 
weaker pupils sent to secondary modern schools, and the stronger educated in 
grammar schools. This might explain some, if not all, the difference in value added 
for borderline pupils. Without access to the 11 + results or cognitive ability test 
(CAT) scores, which attempt to identify potential rather than measure academic 
learning and might be expected to better predict future outcomes, there is a danger of 
inflating the effects of attending a grammar school (and penalties for not), especially 
for borderline pupils. 
 
Furthermore, most of the existing literature compares pupils between the selective 
LEAs and all non-selective areas. The minority of LEAs which use selection at 11 
widely are, however, not typical of the country as a whole. They are more politically 
Conservative and affluent. Comparing performance in these LEAs with all other areas 
will mix up differences in attainment stemming from selection with those due to 
differences in family circumstances of the children. Controls for pupil characteristics 
(FSM eligibility, ethnicity etc.) are unlikely to be sufficiently detailed to rule out bias 
due to unobserved family factors differing across areas. We compare areas with 
similar populations to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Many selective schools are also single sex, and it is important to ascertain which type 
of selection, if any, is most responsible for any variations in results. Both Bone (1983) 
and Smithers and Robinson (1997) (as quoted in Elwood and Gipps (1999)), conclude 
that the performance of girls in single sex schools is higher than in co-educational 
schools for reasons other than the separation of the genders. For example, the 
academic tradition of such schools and the selective bias towards particular types of 
families are all indicators of high outcomes. Smithers and Robinson also report the 
difficulty of separating the single sex effect from the school type, noting that more 
single sex schools are grammar schools and therefore have higher ability intakes.    9
 
Within this study we therefore take great care to compare similar areas with and 
without selection and to identify the true effects of attending a grammar school versus 
failing to make the cut. We also discuss issues around the overlap between single-sex 
schools and grammar schools. 
 
3. Data employed 
The data employed in this research are the DfES pupil level annual census data 
(PLASC) and associated examination and school tables. Pupil level data are available 
for all school age pupils in 2002, including, for the first time, pupil level indicators 
such as FSM, special educational needs and ethnicity.  In order to analyse the effects 
of selection we use a subset of the census, using only data for those pupils in 
mainstream state secondary schools in 2002 for whom we have GCSE results. These 
2002 pupil records have been matched to prior attainment records for KS3 (2000) and 
KS2 (1997) thus allowing for measures of added value throughout their secondary 
school careers. 
 
Supplementary area information has been added to this dataset, including indices of 
deprivation, to address issues such as the heterogeneity of areas when creating our 
matched samples.  For the purpose of this analysis we define an LEA as selective if at 
least 10% of pupils are educated in grammar schools.
7 There are 19 such LEAs. 
Schools have been identified as selective based on the school level information 
collected as part of PLASC. The area level data includes information about 
admissions policy, which identifies schools as being comprehensive, secondary 
modern or grammar. (It is not possible to simply identify schools with the word 
grammar school in their name as this includes several schools who have selected 
pupils based on ability in the past, but no longer do so.)   
 
We use two outcome variables for GCSEs at age 16. The first is the total GCSE (or 
equivalent) score where each grade achieved for each exam sat is one point. A ‘G’ is 
therefore equivalent to one point whilst an ‘A*’ is 8 points.  The second is a capped 
                                                 
7 We have also tried identifying LEAs with 10% of pupils in either a grammar or secondary modern 
school and with 20% in grammar school.  Our results appear to be consistent across the alternative 
measures.   10
score for the best eight GCSEs which takes some account for the fact that pupils take 
differing numbers of GCSEs and certain high performing schools put pupils forward 
for more exams. 
 
We use attainment at KS2 as an explanatory variable in certain regressions, in order to 
capture a measure of value added which allows greater flexibility than the calculation 
preferred by the DfES.  
 
4. Achieving a place in a grammar school 
In this section we begin by considering access to grammar schools within selective 
LEAs.  We ask whether all pupils of a particular ability have an equal opportunity to 
achieve a grammar school place. Table 1 shows that on average just under a quarter of 
pupils in the areas that we have defined as selective LEAs attend grammar schools. 
The other three quarters attend schools which nominally either secondary modern or 
comprehensive (within some areas both names are used and admission policies may 
reflect the differences). Those attending grammar schools have higher KS2 scores, as 
would be expected as selection is undertaken on academic ability at age 11. They also 
have higher attainment scores at KS3 and KS4. More interesting are the variations 
across pupil characteristics. Some 12% of pupils in non-grammar schools in these 
areas are entitled to free school meals (FSM), whereas in the grammar schools only 
2% have FSM entitlement. Among FSM eligible children in selective LEAs just 5.8% 
attend grammar schools as opposed to 26.4% of other children. Special educational 
needs (SEN) children are also massively under represented in grammar schools. 
Whilst those with English as a second language are fairly evenly split and there are 
diverse patterns across ethnic groups, with Black pupils being less likely to make it to 
a grammar school but Asian and other ethnic groups showing a higher than average 
propensity to attend grammar schools. Finally grammar school children are slightly 
older within their year (by 0.3 of a month) and are less likely to be boys. 
 
The selection decision is undertaken on attainment at age 11. If attainment was the 
sole criteria for entry into a grammar school then attainment would be sufficient 
information to predict who attends a grammar school. However, the system may seek 
to adjust the raw attainment score to allow for age within year or gender differences in 
attainment. Further, parental influence and school discretion may lead to other criteria   11
other than ability influence who gains entry into Grammar schools. To investigate this 
we thus employ logistic equations to allow us to consider the possible range of factors 
influencing a pupil’s likelihood of getting into grammar school.   
 
Table 2 reports the results from a series of logistic regression models. LEA fixed 
effects are included in all regressions in the table to account for any variations in the 
mix of characteristics across LEAs. A result of 1 indicates no deviation from the 
average propensity and scores below (above) 1 indicate under (over) representation. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and asterisks indicate statistical 
significance. Column 1 covers all students in selective LEAs and includes the child’s 
KS2 test score (as a series of 0-1 controls for each attainment level) prior to entry into 
secondary school.  
 
The regression results lead to rather more complex conclusions than the simple 
descriptive statistics shown in Table 1. Firstly, younger pupils within a school year 
are disproportionately allowed into grammar schools given their lower attainment, yet 
note that in Table 1 this group is still under represented in grammar schools.  It is 
clear that younger children within the school year have lower KS2 scores, but that the 
over-recruitment of this group into grammar schools for the same KS2 attainment 
only partially offsets this.  
 
Columns 2-4 of Table 2 focus in on parts of the attainment distribution. They indicate 
that black children are no less likely to attend grammar schools given KS2 attainment 
but Asian and other ethnic groups are still more likely to attend. But the most striking 
result is that FSM children are still massively under represented in grammar schools 
given their academic attainment. Also special-needs children or those speaking 
English as a second language are under represented in grammar schools. The 
disadvantage to FSM, special-needs or English as a second language students applies 
to even the highest ability children (column 2), so that taking FSM children in the top 
three KS2 groups (groups 9-11
8) just 32% are attending grammar schools as opposed 
to 60% of non-FSM children.  
   12
Access to grammar schools is clearly not only based on the 11+ exam result. We have 
shown that the results are adjusted so as too equalise the mix for age within the year. 
The regression results indicate, however, that this adjustment is incomplete.  It is still 
the case the younger children are less likely to attend a grammar school even though 
there is partial adjustment for their lower test scores. So, for age, a positive bias is 
created to offset lower attainment.  
 
Similar allowances are not applied to boys, FSM or special-needs children or those 
who have English as a second language. Rather the reverse, these groups are under-
represented given their attainment; the system creates a negative bias for these 
children.  
 
The negative bias probably stems in part from the differences between the 11+ exam 
results and the KS2 tests. Parents in selective LEAs will almost certainly recognise 
that it is the 11+ exam which is the decisive test for school admissions, whereas we 
can only observe the national KS2 tests. There are at least three potential differences 
between the two.  Firstly, the tests may identify different competences. Secondly, the 
11+ may identify smaller differences across pupils in order to provide a finer 
‘ranking’ of ability or aptitude.  Finally, affluent parents have an incentive to provide 
coaching to help their children to pass the 11+ as this could potentially provide free 
education in an area where these parents consider the only alternative to be private 
schooling. Hence it is inevitable that some groups of parents are working the system 
to secure a grammar school place for their child. Whichever factor is in play, the 11+ 
system appears to have design features which (perhaps through parental actions) 
systematically exclude bright children from poor backgrounds, those that have special 
needs and those with English as a second language from attending grammar schools 
whilst partially equalising representation across month of birth.  
 
 
5. Identification and Matching 
Where the brightest pupils within an LEA are taught in grammar schools we might 
expect some impact on attainment across all pupils in the LEA.  In particular we 
                                                                                                                                            
8 The KS2 groups referred to are based on the categories used by the DfES to calculated school level   13
might assume that the rather different peer groups in the various schools would 
influence attainment.  It is important that we control for this in our analysis. 
 
Attainment may also be affected in other ways.   Whilst the selection process changes 
the mix of characteristics of the pupils, non-grammar schools may also have lower 
quality facilities or teachers.  Grammar schools may also benefit from more support 
from parents and the wider community. 
 
We assume in our analysis that pupils live and study in the same LEA and that it is 
therefore appropriate to look at the impact of academic election at LEA level. It has 
been argued that by focusing on LEA effects, the extent to which pupils cross LEA 
boundaries to go to school has been overlooked (for example see Independent 
2/11/99).  Schagen and Schagen (2001 (2)) claim that in 1998 40% of year 7 pupils in 
Slough grammar schools came from outside Slough. However, research in 2002 by 
the DfES
9 shows that 94.7% of the pupils live and go to school in the same authority, 
and that outside London, the extent of inter-authority movement is very small.  
 
Selection only remains in a minority of LEAs and our prior is that selective LEAs 
have characteristics that set them apart from most other areas in England. We 
anticipate that some of those dimensions that differentiate selective LEAs from most 
other LEAS (such as family income) are also correlated with pupil achievement. For 
example, the LEAs that retained selection are those that resisted the move towards 
comprehensives in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  The majority of these areas were 
Conservative led LEAs and these areas are also likely to be more affluent.  
 
By using a matching process we aim to identify LEAs that are most similar in terms 
of several measurable characteristics. This allows us to compare the results of pupils 
in selective LEAs with others in comparable non-selective areas in a way that reduces 
unobserved LEA heterogeneity in the populations considered.  We anticipate, for 
example, that the greater affluence of Conservative areas will not be fully captured by 
the percentage of FSM pupils, but as income is correlated with school outcomes, 
                                                                                                                                            
value added scores. 
9 DfES research relates to PLASC data.  See: 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/datacollection/asc/2003/Docs/IMS%20Final%20Show%2018.10.021.ppt   14
pupils in selective LEAs may outperform other children through these unobserved 
characteristics rather than as a result of the alternative education system. Thus, finding 
very similar areas among non-selective LEAs provides more appropriate comparison 
data by reducing these differences. 
 
We make use of propensity matching to identify suitable matches for our data. 
Creating a dummy to identify LEAs with at least 10% of pupils in grammar schools, 
we run a logit estimation on all English LEAs and generate a prediction of the 
propensity of being selective for each LEA.  The logit estimation uses the model 
presented in Table 3. 
 
Our hypothesis is that local areas under Conservative control with a relatively wealthy 
population are more likely to have kept grammar schools despite widespread 
switching to a comprehensive system. Not all strongly Conservative areas resisted the 
switch to ending selection, and so we include a variable to identify Conservative 
LEAs in the logit estimation.  We also include controls for whether or not the 
authority is a county, and for population density in the area - which may affect travel 
distances to a grammar school. 
 
The results of the logit show that the significant predictors of remaining selective are 
being a largely Conservative LEA, having a low FSM proportion, a high population 
density and not being a county authority (Table 3). By ranking all LEAs according to 
their predicted propensity to be selective we can identify non-selective LEAs with 
similar characteristics to the selective LEAs under observation. Thus we create a 
matched sample of non-selective LEAS (where no pupil attends grammar school) 
using the predicted propensity to be selective from the above logit. There are 19 
selective LEAs with at least 10% of pupils in grammar schools, to which we have 
matched non-selective LEAs in two alternative ways as discussed below.
10  
                                                                                                                                            
 
10  It is possible that middle class parents who are worried about negative peer effects from poor 
neighbours might increase the propensity to keep grammar schools. So those in LEAs where there is 
less social stratification by area will prefer a selective system, whereas those with tightly defined 
affluent areas would get predominantly pupils from affluent homes via a catchment area allocation 
system and be quite happy moving away from the Grammar system. In order to check this we included 
a term capturing the dispersion measure of ward level child poverty (from the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation 2000 to the equation reported in Table 3 but this was not significant.    15
 
There are a number of alternative ways a matched sample could be created. The first 
method used employs a nearest neighbour technique without replacement.  That is, it 
identifies the matched sample by taking the nearest neighbour on the predicted 
propensity score, and using each non-selective LEA no more than once. The 
disadvantage with this method is that it is possible for matches to be made with 
authorities which are very dissimilar if there is a cluster of selective LEAs with high 
predicted scores. One way to limit this effect is to drop the selective LEAs with no 
similarly ranked non-selective LEA (that is, when an area has ‘no common support’). 
The second matching technique employed is calliper matching - for each selective 
LEA (except the one with the highest prediction) two matches are identified with 
propensity scores either side of that of the selective LEA. This method allows for 
replacement - the same non-selective LEA can be matched to more than one selective 
area. Here each LEA in the matched sample has been drawn between one and six 
times
11 in order to identify suitable matches for all 19 selective LEAs. In the analysis 
that follows we report results from ‘one-up, one-down’ calliper matching using only 
LEAs that are entirely comprehensive as suitable matches for selective LEAs, but we 
show later that the main thrust of the results are representative of alternative 
specifications.  
 
Table 4 indicates the differences between selective areas, matched areas and all non-
selective LEAs (standard deviations in parentheses) for the characteristics used in the 
matching equation. The most powerful predictor is the proportion of LEA council 
seats that are Conservative and on this dimension our matched areas are much closer 
to the selective LEAs than the typical non-selective area. One check on the quality of 
the matching is to look at progress between KS1 and KS2 in the selective LEAs and 
our matched sample. That is, to look at primary school attainment for the same LEAs. 
If our matching is working, progress in this pre-selection period should be closer in 
the matched sample than for all LEAs. The results are reported in Appendix Table A.2 
and suggest that pupils in selective LEAs are performing slightly better in value added 
terms in the primary years than all other LEAs, probably because their populations are 
                                                                                                                                            
 
11 To test for the acceptability of repeat matches we have run key analyses with and without frequency 
weights and there are no significant differences.   16
more affluent. Our matched sample eliminates this gap entirely and once population 
characteristics are also conditioned on the gap is almost zero. Hence our matching 
appears to be correcting for underlying unobserved population differences. 
 
Selective LEAs also differ from non-selective LEAs in terms of school organisation. 
Single-sex schools are common in selective LEAs, some 30% of schools being single-
sex, whereas in non-selective areas this type of school is rare. Even in the matched 
areas just 6% of schools are single-sex (see Table 5).  The bulk of single-sex schools 
in selective areas are grammar schools. Conversely, religious schools are not widely 
used in selective areas and grammar schools have notably fewer religious ties. As 
discussed above, academic selection also changes the mix of pupils within schools. As 
shown in Table 1, FSM children are under represented in grammar schools; hence 
FSM children are systematically concentrated into non-grammar schools.  This means 
that we should expect a large variation in the percentage FSM between schools within 
a selective LEA.  Indeed, Table 5 shows that selective LEAs have similar proportions 
of children eligible for FSM or having Special Needs to our matched areas but far 
higher standard deviations in these measures.  
 
Gibbons and Machin (2004) have shown that affluent parents will pay substantially 
over the odds for a house in the catchment area of a good school. Academic selection 
may be expected to reduce any such affect since the grammar schools draw from a 
larger geographical area, and so may result in a reduction the concentration of poor 
children in certain areas. Whether this is true or not is unclear from our data but the 
vast under-representation of poor children in grammar schools dominates any 
potential effect it could have. We see clearly that the selective areas partition children 
not only on grounds of ability, but also of poverty and special needs. 
 
6. The relationship between attainment and selection 
After investigating which pupils are most likely to get into grammar schools, we 
consider the impact of academic selection on pupil attainment? As discussed above, 
the answer must include all pupils in the LEA, not just those in the grammar schools, 
as separating out the highest achieving (and possibly motivated) quarter of students 
may well affect attainment among other pupils.  
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To give a broad picture and to assess the importance of matching we start with the 
whole population. As discussed earlier this may be inappropriate if non-selective LEA 
pupils differ from those in selective LEAs in ways we do not observe with the limited 
range of individual pupil characteristics available. Hence we also compare with 
students from matched, non selective areas.  
 
Three measures of attainment are used.  The first two are measures of output in terms 
of GCSE results. This is arguably the most relevant measure to the pupils, since good 
GCSE results provide the necessary foundations to go onto further or higher 
education.  Either of these two measures will allow us to consider differences in 
output across school and areas.  First, we use the total GCSE points score.  This is the 
sum of an individual’s points from all GCSEs and equivalent exams. Second, we use a 
capped GCSE score, by considering only the sum of points from the best 8 GCSE and 
equivalent exam results. The capped measure is used to counter the differences in the 
number of exams sat in different schools.  Certain schools may well enter pupils for 
10 or more GCSEs, thus raising the pupils total score by sheer volume of exams sat, 
rather than with better performance. Our third attainment measure controls for prior 
attainment: we create a measure of value added which reflects the pupils score in the 
KS2 tests prior to entry into secondary school. This is perhaps the most appropriate 
measure of the impact of attending a school in selective LEA for policy makers and 
educationalists, as it provides a measure of the productivity of the education authority.   
 
Table 6 therefore shows OLS regressions for all pupils for whom we have KS2 and 
GCSE results. Column 1 reports the results of a simple regression model that 
conditions on basic pupil demographics (gender, age) and school size. The key 
variable of interest is the "selective LEA" identifier which takes the value of 1 if the 
pupil attended any school within a selective LEA, or 0 if not.  
 
The first point estimate of this model is that selective LEAs raise attainment by 3.6 
grade points, slightly less than equivalent to raising four GCSE grades from a ’C’ to a 
‘B’. Alternatively, it can be viewed as an 8% increase in the mean total GCSE point 
result. This is substantial, but it should be remembered that we have not yet 
conditioned on many pupil characteristics or on previous attainment and that we have   18
not used the matched sample. The regression is simply comparing pupils in selective 
areas with those in all other areas without adjusting for any population differences.  
 
The model used in Column 2 introduces those pupil characteristics that are observable 
within the data. These cover FSM eligibility, special-needs, English as a second 
language and ethnicity.  The estimated attainment gap is reduced to 3 grade points.  
 
Column 3 shows the result of the regression once we add school controls for single-
sex and religious schools.  The selective LEA premium is now cut to just 1.5 grade 
points. As mentioned above selective LEAs use far more single-sex schools and these 
appear to raise attainment by around 7 grade points.  
 
Finally we explore the impact of school mix in terms of the ethnic mix and the 
proportion of: FSM children, children with special-needs and children with English as 
a second language. The only factor that has a significant impact is FSM. A large 
proportion of FSM children in the school reduces overall attainment (i.e. even for 
non-FSM children). It may be that the overall proportion of children eligible for FSM 
reflects the household income of all the pupils in the school and acts as a good proxy 
for overall poverty amongst children in the school.  Alternatively it could suggest that 
a larger proportion of poor children in a school reduces the attainment of pupils in the 
school through peer group effects. Either way, once school mix characteristics are 
included in the analysis, we see that selective LEAs are not significantly 
outperforming other LEAs.  
 
As noted before the modestly higher achievement in selective LEAs may simply come 
from entering pupils for more GCSEs rather than raising attainment per se. We 
therefore also report the results of the capped GCSE score.  The results (in Table 7) 
indicate a slightly smaller attainment gap in selective LEAs once we take into account 
the variation in number of GCSEs entered.  Using this output measure, the second 
model (with all pupil characteristics included but no school type or composition 
controls included) suggests a modest 2.4 GCSE grade point gain.  
 
Conditioning on KS2 creates a value-added measure for secondary schools between 
the ages of 11 and 16. This will condition out heterogeneity in attainment prior to the   19
selection regime being applied. The results of the value-added regression models are 
reported in Table 8a. Even with only basic controls the estimated impact of being in a 
selective LEA, conditional on attainment at age 11, is much reduced; to less than 1.5  
additional points at GCSE. That is less than the difference between a B and a C in one 
full GCSE and one half GCSE.   
 
Conditioning on more pupil characteristics makes no difference to the results as these 
same characteristics are captured by the conditioning on KS2 implicit in the value- 
added measure. However, introducing controls for school characteristics (single-sex 
and religious schools) reduces the estimates further, to just 1 grade point. The 
apparent benefits of these school types are greatly reduced in value-added estimation. 
It is clear that single-sex schools must be drawing in above-average ability pupils 
even in non-selective areas.   The effects of pupil mix are also less important once we 
control for prior attainment and the results suggest a very small, positive benefit of 
attending a school in a selective LEA. (These results are not sensitive to estimating a 
single equation rather than separate equations for the selective and other LEAs, 
although the separate equation models are statistically preferred.)  
 
The approach adopted so far restricts the background factors to having the same 
impact in selective and other LEAs.  We remove this restriction by estimating models 
for separate samples.  Column 1 and 2 of Table 8b show an illustrative model where 
all factors are considered. Whilst an F-test rejects the single equation model (see 
lower panel to the Table), most coefficients are fairly similar. The one very large 
exception is the proportion of pupils on the special-needs register - this is far more 
damaging in selective LEAs. These separate models can be estimated for all 
specifications reported in columns 1 to 4 and an assessment of the predicted impact of 
attending a school in a selective LEA can be assessed. This will now differ if the 
assessment considers what would happen if the population currently in selective LEAs 
were switched to the non-selective regime; or, if the non-selective LEAs became 
selective (these are Blinder-Oaxaca calculations). The results can differ both because 
the mix of characteristics differs across the two types of LEA and because the regimes 
have different effects for different characteristics. The simulations are reported in the 
lower panel of Table 8a. They suggest that under model 1, with only basic controls, 
pupils in selective LEAs are achieving around 1.5 GCSE additional grade points,   20
whilst for those in non-selective LEAs the gains to becoming selective would be 
slightly smaller. For the more comprehensive model, model 3 (which includes pupil 
and school characteristics), the results shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8b suggest 
the modest gains for children in the selective areas would be even smaller if non-
selective LEAs were to switch to the selective model.  Hence, there is some rationale 
for the current situation of a mix of selective and non-selective areas.  The small 
benefits of a selective system are not fully transferable to those areas that are not 
currently selective.  This appears to be largely due to the greater proportions of 
special-needs children in non-selective areas who would do very badly under an 
academic selection policy. 
 
The results reported up to this point have compared selective LEAs to all other LEAs. 
We know that the LEAs retaining selection are generally wealthier and Conservative 
voting and that our range of pupil indicators is limited, and so we expect there to be 
unobserved differences across the populations of pupils in selective and non-selective 
areas. To correct for this we compare selective LEAs with those non-selective areas 
with similar population characteristics as discussed above. Following the same 
procedures for analysis as before, we now compare selective LEAs to those matched 
LEAs.  
 
Table 9 report the results of the analysis using this matched sample for the value-
added estimate between KS2 and KS4. In general the coefficients reported are fairly 
similar to the first, full sample estimates. The main focus however is on the selective 
LEA indicator, and we see that the results are considerably smaller in Columns 1 and 
2 and become insignificant when school type indicators are included.  
 
The key conclusion from this section is clear; once we condition on pupil 
characteristics, crucially including prior (KS2) attainment, then the effect of being in a 
selective LEA to a similar non-selective LEA is not substantial. Further, the small 
degree of overall higher attainment in selective LEAs is associated entirely with 
greater use of single-sex and religious schools. However, if these school types are also 
engaged in a form of selection it may be appropriate to focus more attention on the 
results in column 2 rather than column 3. At most, selective LEAs raise attainment for 
all their students by less than 1 GCSE grade. The lower bound estimate is that they   21
have no effect at all; the difference depends on how we treat the fact that so many 
grammar schools are also single-sex schools. This conclusion is not sensitive to 
alternative matching rules (results of which are presented in Appendix Table A.3).  
 
So, selective LEAs are not substantially more successful in raising attainment for their 
pupils than non-selective areas, on average. We now focus on whether attending a 
grammar over a non-grammar in a selective area makes any difference to outcome. As 
this selection into grammar is undertaken on ability (and we therefore expect 
differences in raw output as a characteristic of the selection process) we only use 
models based on value-added from now on. We have shown above that it is important 
to use a matching technique to reduce unobserved population differences and 
therefore we now report only comparisons between selective and matched LEAs.  
  
Does getting into a grammar make a difference to attainment? 
 
Table 10 is similar to Table 9 except that now the selective LEA dummy is split into 
two groups; those attending grammar schools and those attending non-grammar 
schools. As this split is based on ability at age 11 we only report value-added 
measures. The results show that (the 1/4 of) pupils attending grammar schools are 
achieving substantially better value-added results than pupils of similar ability in non-
selective areas with similar population characteristics. The students attending non-
grammar schools in selective areas are now doing slightly worse than their equivalent 
in the matched areas, although these estimates are statistically borderline. As the 
estimates presented are for the whole population of pupils in one year (rather than a 
sample) the point estimates are differences in conditional means between the 
populations. The impression formed is that getting into a grammar school is beneficial 
to pupils by a substantial margin; those not achieving a place do slightly less well. 
The final column, Column 4, suggests this is partly due to the crowding of FSM 
pupils into these schools, because once the proportion of the school eligible for FSM 
is taken into account the underachievement of pupils in non-grammar schools 
disappears and the positive grammar school effect is reduced by a quarter. 
 
Table 11 repeats this analysis but shows a number of alternative matching rules. 
Column 1 is equivalent to the results reported in column 3 of Table 11. This is the   22
main matching rule we use in the paper and matches each selective LEA to its nearest 
neighbour above and below on the matching propensity score. Column 2 reports the 
impact repeating the analysis without the authority that has no non-selective authority 
with a higher propensity score (no common support). This has little impact on the 
grammar school effect but makes the estimated results for those not attending 
grammar schools slightly more negative. This pattern is further reinforced if matches 
are allowed with LEAs with some selection, but where there are fewer than 10% of 
pupils in grammar schools (with an average of just 2%) (column 3).  
 
Columns 4-6 repeat the exercise described above, but with a single match, with no 
replacement among the non-selective LEAs. So here, one non-selective authority is 
matched to only one selective one. The disadvantage with this approach is that some 
of the matches may be some distance away. The pattern is consistent, with large 
positive effects for the minority of pupils attending grammar schools and small 
negative effects for those not attending grammar schools in selective LEAs. 
 
To confirm the importance of attaining a grammar school place we now focus on 
'borderline' pupils - those with KS2 grades putting them in group 7 or 8, where most 
pupils do not attend grammar school, and group 9 where typically, they do (if in 
selective areas). This focus on the borderline provides a local treatment effect. Those 
who make it to grammar schools are on average only a fraction more able than those 
who do not and if, when compared to those in non-grammar areas, falling either side 
of the line is important we can ascertain that it is the grammar school place that is 
making the difference. Table 12 shows that for borderline pupils the effect of making 
it into a grammar school is even more marked than it is for all those attending 
grammars. By inference very highly able children benefit less.  The small penalty for 
not getting into a grammar school is very similar to previous estimates. So within 
selective LEAs, making it to a grammar school appears to be extremely beneficial, 
whilst failing to make it results in pupils only marginally underachieving compared 
with those with similar ability in the matched non-selective areas. This high 
achievement is focused especially on borderline students who make it into grammar 
schools.  
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Free School Meals and selection 
As noted in Section 4, children eligible for FSM are substantially under represented in 
grammar schools and this applies even when we control for ability as measured by the 
KS2 test scores. Thus, as shown in Table 2, even highly able poor children are not 
attending grammar schools and the question remains whether the selective system is 
beneficial or harmful to these poorer children. We start then by repeating earlier 
analysis but report results for FSM children separately from non-FSM pupils. We can 
thus assess whether entry to grammar schools is especially beneficial to poorer 
children and what happens to those from poorer families attending other schools in 
selective areas. Tables 13 and 14 are similar to Table 12 but report information on 
non-FSM (Table 13) and FSM children (Table 14) separately. For the larger non-FSM 
sample these results look very similar to those reported earlier. grammar schools 
achieve a mark-up in attainment whilst others are achieving about the same as non-
FSM children elsewhere in the country. FSM pupils (Table 14) who make it to 
grammar schools (a small minority) are benefiting even more substantially from 
making it into these elite schools. For FSM pupils the gains to attending a grammar 
school are more substantive (around 7 to 8 grade points) without extra penalties for 
those not making it. Hence the overall picture is that the minority of high ability 
pupils who are eligible for FSM achieve high attainment in grammars. Finally, turning 
our attention to high ability children not attending grammar schools, Table 15 focuses 
on FSM pupils in KS2 groups 9-11 (the high ability range), with the matched LEAs as 
the comparison group. This confirms relatively high attainment of the minority of 
high ability pupils in grammar schools, who (using column 3) are achieving 6 grade 
points more than pupils in the matched areas. Conversely, the majority of poor high 
ability pupils who are in non-grammar schools are disadvantaged by 1.3 grade points.    
 
Potential biases in our estimates of grammar school effect 
Our data contains KS2 test results rather than the 11+ results used to determine entry 
to grammar schools. If the 11+ results contain superior information that allows 
grammars to distinguish more finely between pupils, or if grammars supplement the 
test results with additional information (interviews, pupil reports etc.), then our 
parameter estimates of the effects of attending a grammar school will be upwardly 
biased. 
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Our main model of focus is: 
 
i i i i i X ability GRAMMAR GCSE ε β β β + ′ + + = 3 2 1  
 
where X is a vector containing other personal and school characteristics. There is no 
perfect measure of ability; grammar schools are proxying for it with 11+ and in our 
data we observe an alternative proxy -  KS2 scores. Our concern is that the difference 
between these two ability proxies is not merely noise, but contains information on the 
pupil’s ability that may be used to determine grammar school admission. This extra 
information is denoted as z i below : 
 
11plus i = KS2 i+z i  
with Corr(GRAMMAR i,z i)>0 and Corr(ability i,z i)>0 
 
In this case, our regression specification can be re-written as: 
 
i i i i i X KS GRAMMAR GCSE η β β β + ′ + + = 3 2 1 2 
 
where  i i i z ξ η + =  and  i ξ  is a random error. In this case  1 β  is both (upwardly) biased 
and inconsistent.  
 
In order to estimate the true effect that selective education has on performance, we 
implement an IV approach. As shown in Table 2, grammar schools take account of 
the lower attainment of younger pupils when setting entry requirements. However, 
these age-adjustments are incomplete and older pupils are still more likely to gain 
entrance than their younger counterparts. 26.5% of those born in the first four months 
of the academic year (September-December) attend a grammar school within selective 
LEAs, compared to only 22.4% of those born in the last four months of the year 
(May-August). This differential exposure to selective education by within-year age 
forms the basis of our identification strategy. So long as within-year age is orthogonal 
to true ability, we can use it as an exogenous source of variation in exposure to 
grammar treatment.   25
 
The remaining analysis focuses on a subset of borderline ability pupils within a 
window of interest related to the attendance differential between the old and young 
sub-groups. In this section of analysis, we omit those pupils born in the middle four 
months of the academic year. For every selective LEA we run a separate logit 
regression of the probability of attending a grammar: 
 
Pr(grammari) = f(genderi, FSMi, SENi, English not mother tonguei, ethnicityi, KS2i) 
 
From this we obtain the propensity to attend a grammar school (and predict the 
propensity for each selective LEAs’ respective matched counterparts). Old and young 
pupils are then ranked (in a descending order) separately on their propensity, which 
we then convert to a percentage. At this point, we restrict the sample to those pupils 
with propensity ranking percentages lying in-between the LEA’s percentage of young 
and old pupils within grammar schools
12. As noted above, this window of interest has 
a mean width of 4%
13. It is within this window that within-year age will be the 
strongest in terms of predicting exposure to grammar school. Given that the 
propensity score is non-continuous, in some LEAs pupils who are equally likely to 
attend a grammar straddle the window, thus yielding a different sub-sample with each 
run. Thus we run the analysis 100 times, and weight pupils by the frequency with 
which they are observed in the window. 
 
Within-year age has a direct effect on attainment at 16: in both selective and non-
selective LEAs, older pupils achieve higher GCSE scores. Before we can use being 
old within-year as an instrument for grammar school exposure, it is first necessary to 
remove this direct age effect. We do this by regressing GSCE score on a dummy for 
being old within-year in the matched LEAs. As there are no grammar schools in these 
LEAs, this relationship should only pick up the direct age effect
14. We then subtract 
                                                 
12 We construct the equivalent window in each selective LEAs matched counterparts, thus enabling us 
to compare equivalent pupils. 
13 The width of the window varies considerably across the LEAs, with a range of 1.3%-11.5%. 2 of the 
19 Selective LEAs in our data had admission systems that more than offset for the lower 11+ 
attainment of younger pupils – the proportion of young pupils attending grammar schools exceed the 
proportion of old pupils. We omit these 2 LEAs from this section of analysis. 
14 Within our borderline selective LEA sample, there are more older males than females. In order that 
we do not conflate being old with being male, we also remove the effect of gender on attainment,   26
this age coefficient from the GCSE scores of those pupils in the selective LEAs, 
leaving us with an excess GCSE score, net of a direct age effect: 
 
i MATCH i i OLD GCSE Excess β ˆ − =  
 
The only way in which being old within-year should now affect attainment for those 
in selective LEAs is indirectly, via exogenously raising the likelihood of attending a 
grammar school. 
 
We first run a series of OLS regressions on the subset of pupils within the window of 
interest to ascertain the magnitude of the potential bias. These results are found in 
Table 16. As we are considering a similar pool of borderline pupils, it is not surprising 
that the coefficient on attending a grammar (relative to not attending a grammar 
within the selective LEAs) is similar to the difference between the point estimates of 
attending a grammar and not attending one reported in Table 12.  
 
We then repeat the analyses using IV estimation, reporting the results in table 17. The 
1
st stage regressions are reported in table A.4 in the appendix. The instrument 
performs well and is fairly strong, with F statistics ranging from 23 to just under 28 
for the three different specifications.  
 
The IV point estimates for attending a grammar are smaller than the OLS equivalents, 
highlighting an upward bias to the OLS coefficients. Controlling for pupil 
characteristics and school type variables, we estimate the effect of attending a 
grammar school as 5.8 age-adjusted GCSE points, 24% smaller than the OLS 
estimate. Hence we believe that the estimates of the attainment gap between those 
getting into grammar schools over those that don’t, reported in Tables 12-15 are 
upwardly biased by a factor of 1.25).  Taking model 3 of Table 10, the quarter of 
pupils attending a grammar in selective LEAs have higher attainment by 3.5 GCSE 
grades and the three-quarters who do not are disadvantaged by around half a grade. 
                                                                                                                                            
allowing this coefficient to differ across the age groups. Thus: 
i i MATCH i MATCH i MATCH i i old male male old GCSE Excess * ˆ ˆ ˆ α δ β + + − =    27
This selection issue is likely to be more acute for poor pupils as so few attend 




This research has investigated the impact of retaining academic selection at age 11. 
The answers are very clear. Overall there is little or no impact on attainment, but the 
quarter of children educated in grammar schools do substantially (around 3.5 grade 
points) better than their peers in similar non-selective areas. This is equivalent to 
raising 3½ GCSEs from a grade ‘C’ to a ‘B’.  The other three-quarters of children not 
making it into grammar schools are disadvantaged by ½ a grade point. In part these 
effects stem from the substantive under-representation of poorer and special-needs 
children in grammar schools. Of high ability children (KS2 groups 9-11) only 32% of 
those who are FSM eligible attend grammar schools as opposed to 60% of non-FSM 
children. The change in the social mix of schools raises attainment in the grammar 
schools but has moderately adverse effects for the rest. The paradox is that for the 
minority of poor children who do gain a place in a grammar school the advantage this 
bestows appears to be greater than for more affluent children. If access could be 
widened then the case for keeping selective education would be greatly enhanced. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of the populations of grammar schools and non grammar schools within selective areas. 
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Table 2 Logistic regression of Probability of Attending a Grammar School, LEA fixed effects.  
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All pupils  Highest 20% of 
KS2 ability 
KS2 score 10-11 
Borderline 
KS2 score 8-9 
Sub – 
borderline 
KS2 score 6-7 








  (4.77)** (0.94)  (5.30)**  (1.55) 








  (6.26)** (1.40)  (6.06)**  (2.34)* 






  (3.31)** (1.25)  (3.97)**  (1.59) 








  (16.29)** (8.96)**  (12.52)**  (4.54)** 








  (7.77)** (0.13)  (6.72)**  (3.81)** 








  (2.98)** (3.52)** (0.70)  (0.85) 








  (1.07) (0.16) (1.51)  (1.27) 








  (13.31)** (6.11)** (9.96)**  (7.60)** 








  (9.48)** (5.48)** (6.11)**  (6.84)** 
KS2  controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  60870 12110 23972 13680 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
LEA fixed effects included   31
 Table 3 Logit estimation of the likelihood of being a Selective LEA   
Cell percentages 
Log likelihood  -42.196 
Pseudo R2         0.256 
Selective 
(10% in Grammar) 
Quartile 1 % Conservative seats  -1.871 
  (2.01)* 
Quartile 2 % Conservative seats  -2.788 
  (2.43)* 
Quartile 3 % Conservative seats  -1.154 
  (1.70) 
County LEA  -1.464 
  (2.01)* 
Pop density. ≥≥≥≥ 75
th Percentile  1.807 
  (2.28)* 
LEA percentage FSM  -14.355 
  (2.66)** 
Constant  1.080 
  (1.40) 
Observations  148 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 4 Characteristics of Selective LEAs with matched and non-matched non-selective 
LEAs. 
  % Conservative 
seats  County LEAs  Population density  LEA 
% FSM 
Match  0.48   0.28   2451.52   0.11  
  (0.18) (0.46)  (3658.38)  (0.07) 
All non selective  0.28   0.23   2460.02   0.16  
  (0.20) (0.42)  (2851.59)  (0.1) 
Selective  0.47  0.21 2383.11   0.11   
 (0.2)    (0.42)  (1533.67)  (0.05) 
Total  0.30   0.23   2450.14   0.16 
 (0.21)  (0.42)  (2714.63)    (0.10) 
   32
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Table 6 OLS regressions for GCSE Results – All Pupils 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Selective LEA  3.617  3.063  1.621  0.719 
 (5.00)**  (5.22)**  (2.18)*  (1.06) 
Male -5.018  -3.354  -3.174  -3.163 
 (56.16)**  (36.08)**  (38.64)**  (38.22)** 
Within-year age: Young  -0.885  -0.567  -0.569  -0.578 
 (13.36)**  (10.19)**  (10.28)**  (10.86)** 
Within-year age: Old  1.006  0.683  0.666  0.675 
 (16.83)**  (12.63)**  (12.18)**  (12.53)** 
School size quintile 2  3.162  2.114  2.149  1.301 
 (5.48)**  (4.47)**  (4.71)**  (3.40)** 
School size quintile 3  3.717  2.348  2.685  1.374 
 (6.61)**  (5.01)**  (6.06)**  (3.57)** 
School size quintile 4  5.372  3.650  4.310  2.431 
 (9.57)**  (7.59)**  (9.59)**  (6.84)** 
School size quintile 5  4.998  3.131  4.216  1.988 
 (8.17)**  (6.03)**  (8.24)**  (4.61)** 
Pupil FSM    -11.465  -11.310  -8.123 
   (44.24)**  (41.84)**  (39.45)** 
Pupil on special needs register    -19.740  -19.483  -19.022 
   (105.27)**  (111.56)**  (104.03)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    1.684  1.365  3.142 
   (3.20)**  (2.91)**  (11.60)** 
Black   -1.171  -2.915  -0.583 
   (2.87)**  (6.87)**  (2.18)* 
Asian, not including Chinese    1.977  1.706  1.949 
   (3.35)**  (3.45)**  (6.98)** 
Other   3.946  2.854  2.682 
   (8.12)**  (6.08)**  (8.13)** 
Religious school dummy      3.411  2.966 
     (8.81)**  (8.45)** 
Single sex BOYS      7.361  6.104 
     (5.96)**  (6.27)** 
Single sex GIRLS      6.680  6.268 
     (7.99)**  (11.13)** 
School % SEN        1.238 
       (0.51) 
School % FSM        -34.480 
       (12.10)** 
School % ESOL        -2.252 
       (1.14) 
School % Black        0.480 
       (0.17) 
School % Asian        9.020 
       (3.26)** 
School % Other ethnic        16.698 
       (3.25)** 
Constant 39.774  44.652  43.107  47.571 
 (78.45)**  (107.46)**  (94.85)**  (80.32)** 
Observations  491436 491106 491106 491106 
R-squared  0.03 0.24 0.26 0.29 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 7 OLS regression results for Capped GCSE – All Pupils  
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Selective LEA  2.831  2.396  1.327  0.613 
 (5.42)**  (5.74)**  (2.52)*  (1.30) 
Male -3.829  -2.510  -2.309  -2.300 
 (60.37)**  (38.16)**  (37.64)**  (37.02)** 
Within-year age: Young  -0.685  -0.434  -0.435  -0.441 
 (13.30)**  (9.83)**  (9.93)**  (10.65)** 
Within-year age: Old  0.778  0.522  0.510  0.517 
 (17.24)**  (12.82)**  (12.34)**  (12.79)** 
School size quintile 2  2.379  1.552  1.566  0.889 
 (5.37)**  (4.34)**  (4.54)**  (3.22)** 
School size quintile 3  2.839  1.757  1.977  0.930 
 (6.37)**  (4.83)**  (5.72)**  (3.23)** 
School size quintile 4  3.979  2.621  3.075  1.573 
 (9.18)**  (7.10)**  (8.80)**  (5.78)** 
School size quintile 5  3.716  2.242  2.996  1.208 
 (7.96)**  (5.76)**  (7.77)**  (3.87)** 
Pupil FSM    -9.072  -8.965  -6.407 
   (44.81)**  (42.78)**  (38.34)** 
Pupil on special needs register    -15.631  -15.457  -15.112 
   (105.15)**  (111.06)**  (114.53)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    1.397  1.148  2.258 
   (4.07)**  (3.69)**  (10.89)** 
Black   -0.697  -1.962  -0.213 
   (2.25)*  (6.00)**  (1.04) 
Asian, not including Chinese    1.461  1.237  1.551 
   (3.80)**  (3.70)**  (7.28)** 
Other   2.879  2.084  1.997 
   (8.29)**  (6.03)**  (8.38)** 
Religious school dummy      2.222  1.871 
     (8.03)**  (7.87)** 
Single sex BOYS      5.087  4.069 
     (5.46)**  (5.66)** 
Single sex GIRLS      5.223  4.872 
     (8.01)**  (11.08)** 
School % SEN        1.256 
       (0.70) 
School % FSM        -27.968 
       (12.91)** 
School % ESOL        -0.449 
       (0.30) 
School % Black        0.571 
       (0.27) 
School % Asian        6.345 
       (3.12)** 
School % Other ethnic        12.233 
       (3.40)** 
Constant 34.670  38.528  37.424  40.977 
 (86.17)**  (119.87)**  (104.58)**  (89.48)** 
Observations  491436 491106 491106 491106 
R-squared  0.03 0.25 0.27 0.30 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Table 8a OLS regression results for Value-added ( KS4-KS2) – All Pupils 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Selective LEA  1.464  1.500  1.042  0.666 
 (5.73)**  (6.76)**  (3.92)**  (2.74)** 
Male -3.112  -2.680  -2.547  -2.535 
 (62.07)**  (52.37)**  (58.93)**  (59.19)** 
Within-year age: Young  0.647  0.612  0.600  0.566 
 (19.49)**  (19.52)**  (18.88)**  (18.23)** 
Within-year age: Old  -0.731  -0.687  -0.678  -0.640 
 (19.56)**  (19.76)**  (19.74)**  (18.84)** 
School size quintile 2  0.758  0.561  0.577  0.240 
 (3.49)**  (2.75)**  (2.81)**  (1.43) 
School size quintile 3  1.035  0.784  0.879  0.348 
 (4.36)**  (3.57)**  (3.96)**  (1.84) 
School size quintile 4  1.679  1.321  1.523  0.761 
 (6.82)**  (5.91)**  (6.84)**  (3.99)** 
School size quintile 5  1.487  1.102  1.431  0.516 
 (5.44)**  (4.25)**  (5.29)**  (2.23)* 
Pupil FSM    -5.281  -5.278  -3.994 
   (40.32)**  (38.94)**  (37.77)** 
Pupil on special needs register    -6.389  -6.412  -6.468 
   (51.49)**  (51.45)**  (63.49)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    3.130  2.994  3.843 
   (9.14)**  (9.33)**  (19.76)** 
Black   0.908  0.332  1.285 
   (3.70)**  (1.41)  (9.26)** 
Asian, not including Chinese    2.871  2.751  2.717 
   (8.69)**  (8.81)**  (13.38)** 
Other   2.149  1.811  1.848 
   (8.24)**  (6.99)**  (10.30)** 
Religious school dummy      0.903  0.749 
     (5.09)**  (5.02)** 
Single sex BOYS      2.019  1.599 
     (4.69)**  (4.70)** 
Single sex GIRLS      2.485  2.421 
     (9.44)**  (12.82)** 
School % SEN        0.613 
       (0.74) 
School % FSM        -15.056 
       (12.05)** 
School % ESOL        -1.544 
       (1.33) 
School % Black        1.002 
       (0.69) 
School % Asian        4.632 
       (3.33)** 
School % Other ethnic        4.757 
       (2.04)* 
Constant 39.078  39.697  39.225  41.136 
 (160.72)**  (178.11)**  (156.73)**  (147.99)** 
Observations  491436 491106 491106 491106 
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Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
F tests  9.40 11.67 8.18  13.40 
Blinder-Oaxaca  - Selective  1.485 1.515  1.156  0.727 
Blinder-Oaxaca  - Non-Selective  -1.321 -1.379  -0.808  -0.527 
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Table 8b OLS regression results for Value-added ( KS4-KS2) – All Pupils 
 
Model  (1) 
As model (4) Selective 
only 
(2) 
As model (4) Non-
selective only 
    
    
Male -2.371  -2.550 
 (17.43)**  (57.24)** 
Within-year age: Young  0.385  0.590 
 (5.17)**  (17.55)** 
Within-year age: Old  -0.765  -0.618 
 (10.04)**  (17.16)** 
School size quintile 2  0.776  0.057 
 (2.08)  (0.34) 
School size quintile 3  0.976  0.209 
 (3.64)**  (0.98) 
School size quintile 4  1.153  0.634 
 (2.84)*  (3.12)** 
School size quintile 5  0.174  0.482 
 (0.35)  (1.94) 
Pupil FSM  -3.743  -4.028 
 (15.45)**  (35.57)** 
Pupil on special needs register  -6.070  -6.543 
 (15.50)**  (61.70)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English  2.654  3.993 
 (7.92)**  (19.24)** 
Black 1.513  1.262 
 (3.91)**  (8.68)** 
Asian, not including Chinese  2.619  2.686 
 (7.88)**  (11.92)** 
Other 1.887  1.846 
 (6.07)**  (9.18)** 
Religious school dummy  0.698  0.792 
 (2.82)*  (4.77)** 
Single sex BOYS  2.056  1.093 
 (3.35)**  (2.98)** 
Single sex GIRLS  2.030  2.370 
 (6.09)**  (10.13)** 
School % SEN  -8.074  2.137 
 (4.22)**  (3.12)** 
School % FSM  -14.911  -15.223 
 (3.79)**  (11.96)** 
School % ESOL  0.529  -1.548 
 (0.20)  (1.14) 
School % Black  -6.595  1.109 
 (1.81)  (0.73) 
School % Asian  2.688  4.631 
 (1.03)  (2.96)** 
School % Other ethnic  3.889  4.695 
 (0.90)  (1.62) 
Constant 43.158  41.002 
 (75.06)**  (143.51)** 
Observations 60816  430290 
R-squared 0.63  0.57 




Table 9 OLS regressions for Value-added ( KS4-KS2): Selective and Matched Areas Only  
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Selective LEA  0.820  0.858  0.145  0.492 
 (3.18)**  (3.39)**  (0.41)  (1.55) 
Male -3.096  -2.617  -2.466  -2.492 
 (37.02)**  (27.12)**  (29.27)**  (31.15)** 
Within-year age: Young  0.659  0.589  0.560  0.525 
 (10.22)**  (9.97)**  (9.24)**  (8.65)** 
Within-year age: Old  -0.712  -0.655  -0.637  -0.604 
 (10.72)**  (10.01)**  (10.32)**  (9.50)** 
School size quintile 2  1.530  1.333  1.312  0.389 
 (5.19)**  (4.29)**  (3.84)**  (1.25) 
School size quintile 3  1.950  1.759  1.782  0.931 
 (6.23)**  (6.16)**  (5.99)**  (3.35)** 
School size quintile 4  1.959  1.757  2.111  1.026 
 (5.97)**  (5.64)**  (6.65)**  (3.20)** 
School size quintile 5  1.529  1.379  1.841  0.816 
 (3.27)**  (2.97)**  (3.96)**  (1.94) 
Pupil FSM    -4.977  -4.859  -3.799 
   (26.33)**  (24.58)**  (19.39)** 
Pupil on special needs register    -6.618  -6.612  -6.393 
   (27.70)**  (28.10)**  (32.07)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    1.669  1.630  2.959 
   (2.97)**  (2.97)**  (9.62)** 
Black   0.866  0.166  1.486 
   (2.87)**  (0.45)  (6.19)** 
Asian, not including Chinese    4.099  3.856  3.076 
   (8.76)**  (8.85)**  (8.68)** 
Other   2.478  2.061  1.970 
   (6.19)**  (5.18)**  (7.77)** 
Religious school dummy      0.956  0.804 
     (3.97)**  (3.08)** 
Single sex BOYS      2.887  1.997 
     (4.85)**  (3.61)** 
Single sex GIRLS      3.201  2.320 
     (9.55)**  (7.88)** 
School % SEN        -3.090 
       (1.81) 
School % FSM        -16.830 
       (5.26)** 
School % ESOL        -2.544 
       (3.05)** 
School % Black        -2.219 
       (0.87) 
School % Asian        5.878 
       (3.32)** 
School % Other ethnic        4.245 
       (1.71) 
Constant 39.229  39.737  39.270  41.835 
 (140.67)**  (139.91)**  (112.59)**  (80.54)** 
Observations  145764 145629 145629 145629 
R-squared  0.54 0.58 0.59 0.60 
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Table 10 OLS regressions for Value-added ( KS2-4): Selective and Matched Areas Only  
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grammar in Selective LEA  5.585  5.293  4.464  3.608 
 (19.60)**  (16.97)**  (9.47)**  (8.87)** 
Non-Grammar in Selective LEA  -0.630  -0.493  -0.693  -0.178 
 (1.67)  (1.34)  (1.67)  (0.44) 
Male -3.069  -2.590  -2.463  -2.473 
 (34.58)**  (25.21)**  (28.64)**  (29.57)** 
Within-year age: Young  0.615  0.549  0.537  0.513 
 (9.21)**  (8.94)**  (8.59)**  (8.28)** 
Within-year age: Old  -0.670  -0.617  -0.608  -0.589 
 (10.59)**  (9.92)**  (10.04)**  (9.34)** 
School size quintile 2  1.106  0.943  1.032  0.401 
 (4.19)**  (3.44)**  (3.45)**  (1.32) 
School size quintile 3  1.849  1.669  1.713  1.099 
 (5.81)**  (6.12)**  (6.02)**  (3.94)** 
School size quintile 4  2.108  1.901  2.090  1.268 
 (7.16)**  (6.82)**  (6.67)**  (3.81)** 
School size quintile 5  1.970  1.792  2.066  1.224 
 (4.70)**  (4.22)**  (4.65)**  (2.95)** 
Pupil FSM    -4.745  -4.709  -3.849 
   (26.37)**  (24.62)**  (20.22)** 
Pupil on special needs register    -6.603  -6.600  -6.542 
   (28.88)**  (28.84)**  (31.02)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    1.764  1.701  2.935 
   (2.80)**  (2.81)**  (9.42)** 
Black   0.767  0.306  1.437 
   (2.37)*  (0.87)  (5.89)** 
Asian, not including Chinese    3.757  3.712  3.030 
   (7.24)**  (7.82)**  (8.46)** 
Other   2.239  2.004  1.955 
   (5.28)**  (4.80)**  (7.76)** 
Religious school dummy      1.340  1.175 
     (4.56)**  (3.90)** 
Single sex BOYS      1.166  0.945 
     (2.06)*  (1.76) 
Single sex GIRLS      1.695  1.502 
     (3.82)**  (3.61)** 
School % SEN        -0.820 
       (0.61) 
School % FSM        -14.690 
       (4.58)** 
School % ESOL        -2.449 
       (2.76)** 
School % Black        -2.197 
       (0.96) 
School % Asian        5.233 
       (2.76)** 
School % Other ethnic        3.117 
       (1.27) 
Constant 39.395  39.883  39.462  41.239 
 (154.44)**  (154.34)**  (122.04)**  (81.40)** 
Observations  145764 145629 145629 145629 
R-squared  0.56 0.59 0.60 0.60 
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Table 11 Robustness to alternative matching rules  
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
































4.464 4.528  4.492  4.710  4.859  4.801  Grammar in 
Selective LEA  (9.47)**  (9.27)** (10.18)** (9.29)**  (8.67)**  (9.61)** 
-0.693 -0.803  -0.911  -0.453  -0.491  -0.665  Non-Grammar in 
Selective LEA  (1.67)  (1.90)  (2.20)*  (1.09)  (1.16)  (1.55) 
   5.424      5.086  Grammar in Non-
Selective LEA      (9.13)**     (7.76)** 
Constant 39.462  39.531  39.659  39.390  39.447  39.477 
 (122.04)**  (118.79)** (128.48)** (96.13)**  (91.85)**  (95.76)** 
Observations  145629 138953 146072 117555 107517 108543 
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Table 12 OLS regressions for Value-added ( KS2-4) – Border line KS2 Groups 7 to 9 only - 
Selective and Matched Areas 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grammar in Selective LEA  7.170  6.686  5.896  4.756 
 (26.74)**  (24.40)**  (14.14)**  (12.87)** 
Non-Grammar in Selective LEA  -0.737  -0.582  -0.791  -0.232 
 (1.90)  (1.59)  (1.88)  (0.58) 
Male -3.202  -2.714  -2.558  -2.579 
 (29.13)**  (21.45)**  (21.26)**  (21.75)** 
Within-year age: Young  0.751  0.675  0.654  0.627 
 (8.68)**  (8.50)**  (8.00)**  (7.86)** 
Within-year age: Old  -0.684  -0.634  -0.632  -0.609 
 (6.81)**  (6.88)**  (6.84)**  (6.47)** 
School size quintile 2  1.257  1.043  1.149  0.446 
 (4.35)**  (3.43)**  (3.47)**  (1.32) 
School size quintile 3  2.078  1.863  1.915  1.186 
 (6.45)**  (6.75)**  (6.44)**  (3.84)** 
School size quintile 4  2.329  2.041  2.247  1.344 
 (7.13)**  (6.70)**  (6.49)**  (3.60)** 
School size quintile 5  2.214  1.985  2.288  1.339 
 (4.82)**  (4.46)**  (4.95)**  (3.05)** 
Pupil FSM    -5.282  -5.238  -4.302 
   (25.39)**  (24.39)**  (18.56)** 
Pupil on special needs register    -7.759  -7.742  -7.517 
   (24.56)**  (24.52)**  (26.09)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    1.573  1.509  2.641 
   (2.84)**  (2.82)**  (7.79)** 
Black   0.380  -0.106  1.199 
   (0.84)  (0.23)  (2.95)** 
Asian, not including Chinese    3.970  3.930  3.397 
   (8.60)**  (9.44)**  (9.81)** 
Other   2.126  1.887  1.982 
   (4.36)**  (3.99)**  (5.22)** 
Religious school dummy      1.400  1.228 
     (4.84)**  (4.14)** 
Single sex BOYS      0.976  0.824 
     (1.60)  (1.45) 
Single sex GIRLS      1.754  1.582 
     (3.66)**  (3.49)** 
School % SEN        -2.140 
       (1.42) 
School % FSM        -15.183 
       (3.89)** 
School % ESOL        -2.089 
       (2.39)* 
School % Black        -3.167 
       (1.13) 
School % Asian        5.551 
       (2.24)* 
School % Other ethnic        1.596 
       (0.59) 
Constant 39.181  39.863  39.417  41.542 
 (133.59)**  (137.63)**  (111.93)**  (74.84)** 
Observations  78018 77946 77946 77946 
R-squared  0.21 0.28 0.28 0.29 
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Table 13 OLS regression results for Value-added ( KS2-4) – Non-FSM Pupils in Selective and 
Matched Areas 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grammar in Selective LEA  5.398  5.198  4.415  3.428 
 (20.13)**  (17.16)**  (9.29)**  (8.71)** 
Non-Grammar in Selective LEA  -0.475  -0.509  -0.710  -0.173 
 (1.26)  (1.33)  (1.63)  (0.41) 
Male -3.127  -2.628  -2.525  -2.540 
 (34.12)**  (25.52)**  (29.34)**  (30.65)** 
Within-year age: Young  0.602  0.563  0.551  0.525 
 (9.39)**  (9.44)**  (8.98)**  (8.73)** 
Within-year age: Old  -0.640  -0.619  -0.611  -0.595 
 (9.98)**  (9.53)**  (9.62)**  (8.87)** 
School size quintile 2  0.931  0.912  0.996  0.348 
 (3.34)**  (3.20)**  (3.21)**  (1.10) 
School size quintile 3  1.772  1.704  1.746  1.064 
 (6.06)**  (6.34)**  (6.14)**  (3.69)** 
School size quintile 4  1.983  1.931  2.117  1.233 
 (7.01)**  (7.09)**  (6.81)**  (3.62)** 
School size quintile 5  1.840  1.849  2.121  1.226 
 (4.58)**  (4.48)**  (4.86)**  (2.89)** 
Pupil on special needs register    -6.539  -6.533  -6.435 
   (28.16)**  (28.05)**  (30.06)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    1.265  1.202  2.370 
   (2.42)*  (2.42)*  (9.04)** 
Black   0.072  -0.390  0.997 
   (0.21)  (1.07)  (3.66)** 
Asian, not including Chinese    3.671  3.634  3.026 
   (8.04)**  (8.67)**  (8.99)** 
Other   2.048  1.826  1.839 
   (5.03)**  (4.54)**  (8.25)** 
Religious school dummy      1.333  1.168 
     (4.38)**  (3.81)** 
Single sex BOYS      1.160  0.960 
     (1.98)  (1.76) 
Single sex GIRLS      1.558  1.380 
     (3.34)**  (3.20)** 
School % SEN        -1.195 
       (0.89) 
School % FSM        -16.188 
       (4.62)** 
School % ESOL        -2.069 
       (2.71)** 
School % Black        -3.479 
       (1.68) 
School % Asian        5.427 
       (2.72)** 
School % Other ethnic        2.979 
       (1.17) 
Constant 39.889  39.986  39.586  41.587 
 (149.53)**  (149.71)**  (119.36)**  (79.53)** 
Observations  132663 132663 132663 132663 
R-squared  0.56 0.58 0.58 0.59 
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Table 14 OLS regression results for Value-added ( KS2-4) –  FSM Pupils in Selective and 
Matched Areas 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grammar in Selective LEA  8.498  8.391  7.120  6.906 
 (12.10)**  (12.40)**  (9.38)**  (8.61)** 
Non-Grammar in Selective LEA  -0.460  -0.098  -0.299  0.183 
 (0.95)  (0.29)  (0.82)  (0.52) 
Male -2.779  -2.195  -1.858  -1.801 
 (13.06)**  (10.57)**  (8.43)**  (8.22)** 
Within-year age: Young  0.469  0.415  0.403  0.394 
 (1.97)  (1.91)  (1.86)  (1.79) 
Within-year age: Old  -0.590  -0.547  -0.511  -0.475 
 (2.25)*  (2.28)*  (2.14)*  (2.03)* 
School size quintile 2  1.196  1.248  1.363  0.868 
 (2.70)**  (3.45)**  (3.75)**  (2.79)** 
School size quintile 3  1.110  1.316  1.436  1.192 
 (1.73)  (2.38)*  (2.83)**  (2.55)* 
School size quintile 4  1.262  1.505  1.727  1.298 
 (3.05)**  (3.28)**  (3.68)**  (2.84)** 
School size quintile 5  0.892  1.006  1.268  0.723 
 (1.44)  (1.63)  (2.05)*  (1.23) 
Pupil on special needs register    -6.862  -6.892  -7.168 
   (23.49)**  (24.02)**  (26.31)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    3.973  3.874  5.022 
   (4.07)**  (4.07)**  (7.41)** 
Black   3.122  2.581  2.877 
   (6.40)**  (5.13)**  (4.76)** 
Asian, not including Chinese    4.006  3.892  3.498 
   (4.23)**  (4.40)**  (4.29)** 
Other   3.663  3.322  3.202 
   (4.12)**  (3.77)**  (4.08)** 
Religious school dummy      1.518  1.456 
     (3.36)**  (2.96)** 
Single sex BOYS      1.254  0.627 
     (1.77)  (0.99) 
Single sex GIRLS      3.239  3.185 
     (5.32)**  (5.91)** 
School % SEN        3.090 
       (1.74) 
School % FSM        -9.530 
       (5.04)** 
School % ESOL        -3.489 
       (1.73) 
School % Black        2.261 
       (0.81) 
School % Asian        3.253 
       (1.35) 
School % Other ethnic        2.477 
       (0.69) 
Constant 34.350  33.795  33.178  34.075 
 (75.69)**  (92.03)**  (81.34)**  (59.23)** 
Observations  12966 12966 12966 12966 
R-squared  0.40 0.48 0.48 0.49 
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Table 15 OLS regression results for Value-added ( KS2-4) – High Ability FSM Pupils KS2 
Groups 9-11 in Selective and Matched Areas Only 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Grammar in Selective LEA  6.861  7.205  5.723  4.821 
 (9.30)**  (10.62)**  (7.13)**  (5.36)** 
Non-Grammar in Selective LEA  -1.210  -1.072  -1.337  -0.681 
 (1.53)  (1.36)  (1.66)  (0.84) 
Male -2.801  -2.457  -1.837  -1.708 
 (5.23)**  (4.68)**  (2.83)**  (2.69)* 
Within-year age: Young  -0.798  -0.858  -0.857  -0.777 
 (0.99)  (1.14)  (1.16)  (1.07) 
Within-year age: Old  -1.269  -1.179  -1.086  -1.006 
 (1.94)  (1.89)  (1.72)  (1.60) 
School size quintile 2  1.970  1.877  2.113  1.136 
 (2.29)*  (2.29)*  (2.58)*  (1.43) 
School size quintile 3  1.372  1.465  1.667  0.898 
 (1.61)  (1.69)  (1.88)  (0.99) 
School size quintile 4  2.117  1.930  2.348  1.245 
 (2.52)*  (2.14)*  (2.54)*  (1.42) 
School size quintile 5  2.237  2.067  2.490  1.422 
 (2.05)*  (1.77)  (2.09)*  (1.21) 
Pupil on special needs register    -8.020  -7.927  -7.780 
   (5.85)**  (5.84)**  (5.58)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    2.826  2.814  4.239 
   (1.90)  (1.91)  (3.24)** 
Black   0.485  0.154  1.073 
   (0.33)  (0.10)  (0.49) 
Asian, not including Chinese    0.971  0.878  2.273 
   (0.61)  (0.59)  (1.30) 
Other   1.388  0.823  1.272 
   (0.68)  (0.42)  (0.56) 
Religious school dummy      1.296  0.886 
     (1.35)  (0.96) 
Single sex BOYS      1.322  1.030 
     (1.30)  (1.05) 
Single sex GIRLS      3.758  3.571 
     (3.60)**  (3.31)** 
School % SEN        -0.922 
       (0.27) 
School % FSM        -9.926 
       (1.97) 
School % ESOL        -2.122 
       (0.62) 
School % Black        1.047 
       (0.19) 
School % Asian        -5.034 
       (1.00) 
School % Other ethnic        2.618 
       (0.55) 
Constant 42.591  42.552  41.470  43.657 
 (44.01)**  (42.46)**  (35.15)**  (33.44)** 
Observations 1718  1718  1718  1718 
R-squared  0.15 0.20 0.21 0.22 
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Table 16 OLS regression results for GCSE excess –  Borderline Pupils in Selective Areas 
 
Model  (1) (2) (3) 
Grammar 8.187  8.252  7.670 
 (12.01)**  (12.36)**  (11.04)** 
MALE 1.971  2.354  2.145 
 (2.80)*  (2.95)**  (2.38)* 
school size quintile 2  1.445  1.380  1.353 
 (2.53)*  (2.19)*  (1.98) 
school size quintile 3  1.474  1.316  1.496 
 (1.96)  (1.63)  (1.96) 
school size quintile 4  1.835  1.815  2.240 
  (2.22)* (2.06) (2.50)* 
school size quintile 5  2.153  1.990  2.581 
 (1.68)  (1.51)  (1.95) 
pupil FSM    -1.639  -1.381 
   (1.19)  (1.06) 
pupil on special needs register    -5.370  -5.303 
   (2.63)*  (2.59)* 
pupil mothertongue not English    -0.067  0.154 
   (0.06)  (0.14) 
Black   1.914  2.099 
   (1.36)  (1.53) 
Asian, not including Chinese    0.664  0.909 
   (0.35)  (0.49) 
Other   0.669  0.625 
   (0.51)  (0.53) 
Religious school dummy      1.999 
     (3.00)** 
Single sex BOYS      1.915 
     (2.16)* 
Single sex GIRLS      1.594 
     (2.40)* 
Constant -3.201  -3.119  -3.961 
  (2.28)* (2.10) (2.50)* 
Observations  4202 4202 4202 
R-squared  0.19 0.20 0.21 
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Table 17 IV regression results for GCSE excess – Borderline Pupils in Selective Areas 
Model  (1) (2) (3) 
Grammar 7.866  6.786  5.825 
 (2.52)*  (2.64)**  (2.03)* 
MALE 1.981  2.396  2.140 
 (2.88)**  (2.98)**  (2.40)* 
school size quintile 2  1.487  1.573  1.588 
 (2.54)*  (2.33)*  (2.28)* 
school size quintile 3  1.498  1.425  1.580 
 (1.85)  (1.55)  (1.92) 
school size quintile 4  1.782  1.570  2.219 
 (2.10)*  (1.82)  (2.58)** 
school size quintile 5  2.021  1.391  2.147 
 (1.25)  (0.99)  (1.53) 
pupil FSM    -1.625  -1.294 
   (1.16)  (0.94) 
pupil on special needs register    -5.251  -5.157 
   (2.58)**  (2.54)* 
pupil mother tongue not English    -0.083  0.333 
   (0.07)  (0.30) 
Black   2.028  2.355 
   (1.39)  (1.56) 
Asian, not including Chinese    0.637  0.857 
   (0.35)  (0.47) 
Other   0.642  0.597 
   (0.50)  (0.52) 
Religious school dummy      1.608 
     (1.85) 
Single sex BOYS      2.860 
     (1.99)* 
Single sex GIRLS      2.498 
     (2.06)* 
Constant -3.058  -2.468  -3.534 
 (1.46)  (1.36)  (2.04)* 
Observations  4202 4202 4202 
F test for instrument in 1
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Appendix A.1 Local Education Authorities with more than 10 percent of children attending selective schools 
 
LEA Frequency  Percentage of selective 
pupil sample 
Barnet 2842  4.65 
Bexley 2568  4.20 
Kingston-upon-Thames 1137  1.86 
Sutton 1976  3.23 
Wirral 3662  5.99 
Trafford 2502  4.09 
Calderdale 2201  3.6 
Buckinghamshire 4613  7.54 
Poole 1491  2.44 
Bournemouth 1517  2.48 
Reading 905  1.48 
Slough 1124  1.84 
Plymouth 2715  4.44 
Torbay 1307  2.14 
Southend-on-Sea 1773  2.90 
Kent 13509  22.09 
Medway 2914  4.76 
Gloucestershire 5738  9.38 
Lincolnshire 6669  10.9 




Appendix A.2  
 
OLS regression results for Value-added ( KS1-2) – All Pupils 
 
Model  (1) (2) 
Selective LEA  0.103 0.092 
 (1.28)  (1.10) 
Observations 529747  529747 




OLS regression results for Value-added ( KS1-2) – Selective and Matched Areas Only 
 
Model  (1) (2) 
Selective LEA  -0.016 -0.012 
 (0.18)  (0.14) 
Observations 152052  152052 
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Appendix A.3 – Robustness to alternative matching rules 
 

































Selective LEA  0.145 0.119  -0.000  0.439 0.486  0.353 
  (0.41) (0.33)  (0.00)  (1.30) (1.39)  (1.01) 
Constant  39.270 39.324  39.487  39.156 39.186  39.171 
 (112.59)**  (107.69)**  (112.94)**  (88.02)**  (82.34)**  (84.64)** 
Observations 145629  138953  146072  117555  107517  108543 
R-squared 0.59  0.59  0.59  0.59  0.59  0.59 
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Appendix A.4 – First stage regressions for attending a Grammar school – Old and Young Borderline Pupils in 
Selective LEAs 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Within-year age: Old  0.172  0.182  0.145 
 (4.83)**  (4.93)**  (5.28)** 
MALE 0.016  0.003  -0.024 
 (0.54)  (0.11)  (0.80) 
School size quintile 2  0.148  0.153  0.144 
 (1.18)  (1.21)  (1.51) 
School size quintile 3  0.078  0.082  0.052 
 (0.65)  (0.66)  (0.62) 
School size quintile 4  -0.159  -0.156  -0.006 
 (1.38)  (1.33)  (0.08) 
School size quintile 5  -0.394  -0.386  -0.221 
 (4.46)**  (4.24)**  (3.93)** 
Pupil FSM    0.051  0.079 
   (0.67)  (1.29) 
Pupil on special needs register    0.135  0.122 
   (2.82)*  (3.61)** 
Pupil mother tongue not English    -0.008  0.097 
   (0.12)  (1.50) 
Black   0.166  0.208 
   (1.67)  (2.13)* 
Asian, not including Chinese    -0.008  -0.020 
   (0.18)  (0.40) 
Other   0.008  0.006 
   (0.14)  (0.09) 
Religious school dummy      -0.212 
     (2.91)* 
Single sex BOYS      0.504 
     (6.21)** 
Single sex GIRLS      0.476 
     (6.17)** 
Constant 0.359  0.347  0.161 
 (6.18)**  (5.58)**  (4.14)** 
Observations  4202 4202 4202 
R-squared  0.16 0.16 0.40 
 
 
 
 
 